How EU Countries Are Re-engaging the Sahel

The coup wave that swept across Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, and to a lesser extent influenced the political situation in Chad, reshaped these countries’ relations with their long-standing European Union partners. The breakdown in relations led to the severing of diplomatic ties, the termination of security agreements and the withdrawal of European military forces from the region. France was particularly affected, losing its robust military presence across several of its former strongholds. This marked a significant decline in European influence in the Sahel. Years after the coups, during which military leaders in these countries have consolidated power, some EU member states are now exploring ways to rebuild relations and re-establish their presence in the region.

France, following the withdrawal of its troops from Chad in 2024 and the termination of security cooperation, has begun working towards a renewed relationship with the Chadian government. Belgium, meanwhile, has also stepped up diplomatic engagement, with its deputy prime minister visiting Burkina Faso and Niger in August 2026 to reopen dialogue and strengthen cooperation. These engagements do not necessarily indicate a full restoration of relations, but they suggest that some European countries are looking for ways to rebuild ties with Sahelian governments. However, the response remains uneven, particularly across the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), where relations with European partners remain strained and France continues to face considerable suspicion. This raises questions about the approaches European countries are adopting, how sustainable they are and whether they can gain the confidence of military leaders and the wider population.

Mutually Beneficial cooperation

The latest wave of European engagement appears to place greater emphasis on mutually beneficial cooperation, flexibility and locally defined priorities, with external partners providing support. Belgium's recent visits to Burkina Faso and Niger reflect this shift. During the engagements, Belgian officials emphasised respect for the choices of local authorities and a willingness to support priorities identified by the governments themselves. This represents a departure from the more conditional approach that has often characterised Western engagement in the region, where cooperation has been tied to external expectations around governance and political reforms. Belgium's position suggests that future engagement may depend more on allowing Sahelian governments to determine their priorities, while European partners provide assistance where requested.

France's engagement with Chad also reflects this changing approach. Paris has long been associated with Françafrique, a relationship in which French interests have often been perceived as taking precedence over those of its African partners. Following the withdrawal of French troops in January 2025, however, both countries have been working towards restoring military cooperation under a more limited arrangement. The emerging framework focuses on training, intelligence sharing and other forms of military support, without returning to the previous model of a large, permanent French military presence. This approach could make renewed cooperation more acceptable to N'Djamena, which has placed greater emphasis on sovereignty and control over its security partnerships. It also allows Chad to engage with France while maintaining relations with other external partners. However, the extent to which this arrangement can overcome the mistrust that led to the earlier breakdown in relations remains uncertain.

Security cooperation and humanitarian assistance

Other European countries are also seeking to maintain or expand their influence in the region, although their approaches differ. Some analysts may interpret Belgium's renewed engagement as an opportunity to occupy space previously dominated by France. However, it remains unclear whether Brussels is seeking to replace Paris or simply preserve a working relationship with Sahelian governments. Hungary, by contrast, moved to establish closer security ties with Chad in the aftermath of the regional coups. It deployed approximately 200 soldiers to the country and expanded its engagement through security cooperation and humanitarian assistance. Budapest has also presented itself as a potential intermediary between the EU and Sahelian governments, although the extent of its ability to fulfil that role remains to be seen.

Some EU countries have maintained a presence in the region despite the deterioration in relations between the AES governments and Western partners. Italy, for instance, has retained a military contingent at Air Base 101 in Niamey, Niger, following the departure of French and US forces. Rome has maintained a relatively pragmatic approach, allowing it to preserve its relationship with Niger's military authorities while continuing its security engagement. Germany, on the other hand, has withdrawn its military personnel from Niger and shifted much of its engagement towards development and humanitarian assistance. These different approaches show that European countries are not pursuing a single strategy for rebuilding relations with the Sahel. Some are maintaining limited security cooperation, while others are relying more heavily on diplomacy and development assistance.

What does it mean for the future of EU-Sahel relations?

These changing dynamics have several implications for the future of EU-Sahel relations. First, European engagement is likely to become more flexible, with greater emphasis on locally defined priorities and less reliance on the conditional approach that previously shaped relations. This could help rebuild confidence among governments that have repeatedly criticised external interference. However, a more flexible approach does not automatically guarantee stronger relations, particularly where distrust is rooted in the history of European involvement in the region.

Second, the willingness of Sahelian governments to engage with European countries will vary. Chad has shown an interest in restoring aspects of its relationship with France, while Niger and Burkina Faso have recently reopened dialogue with Belgium. However, this does not mean they are equally receptive to all European partners. Niamey and Ouagadougou are likely to remain cautious towards France because of the history of their relations and allegations of external interference. Mali may prove more difficult for European countries to re-engage, given the depth of its political and security disagreements with Western partners and the military government's distrust of external involvement.

The worsening security situation across the Sahel also complicates these efforts. European countries may face renewed suspicion whenever their activities are perceived as supporting efforts to undermine existing governments. This could make security cooperation particularly sensitive, even where both sides share concerns about armed groups. For European partners, the challenge will be to provide support without creating the impression that they are seeking to regain political influence over the region.

The wider population also matters. Years of European military involvement have failed to produce the security improvements many communities expected, contributing to declining confidence in some former partners. Although Russia's Africa Corps has become an important security partner for the AES countries, its presence has not resolved the region's security challenges. European countries could therefore find greater room for engagement through development programmes, humanitarian assistance and livelihood initiatives, particularly those that respond to the needs of young people. Such engagement may help rebuild public confidence, although its impact will depend on whether local communities experience tangible improvements.

There is also a limit to how far European countries can go in adopting a low-profile approach. While flexibility and restraint may make their engagement more acceptable, avoiding difficult political and security issues could also limit their ability to respond to worsening conditions. European governments will have to balance respect for national sovereignty with their own security and development interests, particularly as armed groups continue to expand their activities across parts of the Sahel.

EU-Sahel relations are therefore at a crossroads. European countries are exploring different ways to restore their presence, from limited military cooperation to diplomatic engagement and development assistance. A lighter footprint and greater flexibility may help rebuild relations, but neither guarantees a lasting partnership. Much will depend on whether European governments can maintain the trust of Sahelian authorities and populations while adapting to a regional environment in which military governments are increasingly determined to control their own security partnerships, while multiple armed actors continue to pose risks to regional stability.